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Summary
Famine: Lessons Learned was produced as the world was responding to four 
potential famines simultaneously – in Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. 
Much has been written and researched on famine, and many lessons on how to 
best prevent and respond to famine have been learned the hard way. This paper 
therefore draws on lessons learned from the last 30-plus years of famine crises 
and response, going back to famines in Ethiopia and Sudan in the 1980s, up to the 
most recent famine in Somalia in 2011. 
BEFORE: The causes of famine
Lesson 1. The causes of  famine 
Drought causes crop failure, but it is vulnerability to the impacts of drought on 
livelihoods and food systems that causes famine. Famine follows a sequence of 
failures in the food system: first in production; then in the markets, consequently 
affecting employment opportunities; and finally in humanitarian relief such as food 
aid. In conflict-triggered famines food production, employment, trade and food 
aid can all be deliberately targeted or compromised. Famines can be prevented 
by intervening at any point in the food system: by boosting food production, 
strengthening rural food markets, providing employment opportunities (including 
labour-intensive public works), introducing ‘shock-responsive’ social protection, or 
providing timely famine relief.
Lesson 2. Marginalisation
Children and young infants are at the greatest risk during famine, but adults and 
adolescents can also die in large numbers and should not be overlooked. Social, 
economic and political marginalisation can be at the root of vulnerability, but are 
easy to miss. This can be doubly compounded if humanitarian operations and 
aid flows are captured by elites or dominant groups. Poverty is closely linked 
to famine, and most often it is the poorest who are at highest risk. However, in 
certain cases – especially in conflict-related famines – the socioeconomic profile 
of vulnerability is more complicated. Careful analysis of the causes of famine 
vulnerability, and who is likely to be most vulnerable, should inform targeting.
Lesson 3. Timeliness
High-quality early warning systems and food security and nutrition information 
systems exist in many countries and regions that are vulnerable to food crisis 
and famine. However, early warning must be complemented with early action. 
Mechanisms need to be found that provide incentives for early action by 
governments, donors, and implementing agencies, and build accountability for 
failures to prevent future famines. Early warning systems must better incorporate 
and analyse data on markets, political context (e.g. conflict) and nutrition, and 
disseminate their analysis and findings to policymakers in more accessible ways, 
for better informed decision-making. The IPC protocols are a good example of this.
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DURING: Response – management and type of response
Lesson 4. Camps
Camps can become ‘aid magnets’. Rather than setting up camps, reduce the 
necessity for people to migrate in search of food by scaling up social protection in 
rural communities and distributing food aid in famine-affected villages. Provide safe 
water and sanitation facilities in famine zones: supply clean drinking water either 
by protecting and deepening existing wells, digging more boreholes, or using water 
tankers; and install toilets or improved latrines and waste disposal, especially 
in refugee camps but also wherever famine-affected people are concentrated. 
Immunise children against communicable diseases, especially measles, which was 
the major killer of children during the Darfur and Somali Region famines, due to the 
lack of vaccines.
Lesson 5. Response
There has historically been a ‘food first’ bias in famine response, with crucial 
sectors such as water, sanitation and especially health being relatively neglected. 
Responding to the health causes of famine mortality saves lives. Communicable 
diseases such as Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) and measles are major killers. 
Good surveillance, an ability to respond rapidly, having a reliable supply of ready-
to-use therapeutic food (RUTF) and mass immunisation in situations of famine 
migration are essential if mortality is to be prevented. Innovative practices such 
as the distribution of cash in Somalia 2011 can save lives, although cash is not a 
panacea. 
Lesson 6. Conflict
Famine can be used as a deliberate strategy during times of conflict. It is important 
to think about the function of famine, which often has a political, economic 
or military rationale. Famines can be caused by acts of omission or acts of 
commission. In conflict, manipulation of aid is common, with warring parties 
denying access and diverting aid to their supporters. Geopolitics are often involved 
in supporting one side in the conflict, adding to the way in which aid can be 
manipulated. Gaining access to famine zones is political and requires advocacy 
and quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Ultimately, agencies must be prepared to 
withdraw if they consider their aid has become part of the problem.
Lesson 7. Safety nets
The best antidote to famine is an ‘anti-famine political contract’, meaning that the 
state acknowledges its duty to prevent famine, and mechanisms exist for citizens 
to hold the state accountable if a famine occurs. Such a contract can be secured 
through the institutions of multi-party democracy, but democracy is not essential 
and might not always be sufficient. Although this is not an area that international 
agencies can directly influence, they are able to support civil society advocacy to 
promote the right to food, which most governments have ratified in international law. 
Social protection programmes have been shown to be effective in reducing food 
insecurity. ‘Shock-responsive safety nets’ are emerging as a potential anti-famine 
intervention – not in isolation, but as a complement to traditional famine responses.
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Lesson 8. The media
Traditional media reporting has often misrepresented famine, favouring an 
uncomplicated, over-simplistic narrative at the expense of historical, political, 
social and economic accuracy. Exercising ‘media social responsibility’ through 
encouraging journalists and broadcasters to work closely with aid agencies to 
understand the complexities of the situation before, during and after would promote 
a more informed discussion around longer-term solutions to recurrent famines. Aid 
agency involvement with local as well as foreign media would inform local affected 
populations and give them voice, which is imperative to encourage change. Social 
media, user-generated content (UGC) and citizen journalists can all contribute to 
disrupting convenient narratives and expand campaign networks.
AFTER: Post-famine recovery
Lesson 9. Recovery
Famine can lead to destitution and permanent livelihood changes. Recovery efforts 
should support new livelihood options as well as trying to recover old ones. Action 
in advance of famines such as commercial destocking, and installing the trade 
infrastructure to facilitate this, can both preserve assets and help people to cope. 
Access to employment and social capital are extremely important, and public 
works projects are an excellent way of providing additional labour opportunities. 
The aftermath of a famine is the best time for reflection and to put in place 
mechanisms, institutions and resources to ‘famine-proof’ vulnerable communities.
Lesson 10. Accountability
Where there is political will, famines – even deliberate famines – can be prevented. 
Public pressure and advocacy on political leaders is the most effective way to 
trigger this. When famine is used deliberately as a method of war all efforts should 
be made to hold those responsible accountable. The body of law surrounding the 
use of famine as a method of war needs development so that eventually mass 
starvation is considered a war crime.
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BEFORE: The causes of famine
Lesson 1. Famine is not caused by 
a shortage of  food, but usually by a 
combination of  entitlement failure, 
market failure, and often conflict.
Famines may seem like simple tragedies, terrible in their impacts but easy to 
explain. Most famines affect vulnerable rural communities in poor countries and 
are triggered by natural disasters, such as droughts or floods that cause crop 
harvests to fail. If there is not enough food to feed the population, mass starvation 
must inevitably follow. In Africa, it is true that most famines, even recent ones, 
are triggered by drought. But the ‘drought causes famine’ narrative is no longer 
adequate – if it ever was. The pathway to contemporary famines is much more 
complex, and several famines have occurred despite there being more than 
enough food in the country, sometimes even without any decline in food availability.
Drought is not the only trigger factor. In a 2017 article for the London Review of 
Books, Alex de Waal notes, ‘Mass starvation as a consequence of the weather 
has very nearly disappeared: today’s famines are all caused by political decisions, 
yet journalists still use the phrase “man-made famine” as if such events were 
unusual.’1 Often civil war or insecurity is the trigger, sometimes in conjunction with 
drought, as in Somalia in 2011. Conflict and insecurity can undermine agricultural 
production, disrupt trade, and obstruct humanitarian relief. ‘Conflict famines’ are 
usually a byproduct of war; but sometimes famine conditions are deliberately 
created by one group using starvation as a weapon against others – as with ‘siege 
famines’, when people are denied access to available food.
Any comprehensive analysis of a famine must explain why the entire food system 
fails. Food production failure is only the first of a series of failures in access to 
food. In Poverty and Famines, Amartya Sen identified four legal sources of food, 
which he called ‘entitlements’: people can either grow their own food (‘production-
based’); buy food (‘trade-based’); work for food (‘labour-based’); or be given food 
– for example, food aid (‘transfer-based’).2 For a harvest failure to escalate into a 
famine, all four sources of food must fail, either sequentially or simultaneously.
What about ‘trade-based’ entitlements – if food production is inadequate, why don’t 
those affected simply buy the food they need in local markets? There are two possible 
explanations – market failure, and poverty. Fragmented markets are common in 
remote rural areas. Traders might decide not to bring food into famine zones, because 
transport costs are high and demand is limited and temporary, so incentives for 
traders are insufficient.3 In conflict-related famines, traders might stay away because 
of security concerns. This is one reason why people migrate out of famine zones – to 
search for food – because local markets are empty, just like their own granaries.
10
FAMINE: LESSONS LEARNED
The second explanation is poverty. Even if food is available in local markets, 
farmers who are already poor and have zero savings simply cannot afford to 
buy that food, especially when prices start to rise. Sen explained the mechanism 
of ‘exchange entitlement failure’: during a food crisis, food prices rise due to 
excessive demand, while prices for assets such as livestock fall due to excessive 
supply. A falling grain/livestock price ratio is often used as an early warning 
indicator of famine, especially in pastoralist communities.
What about ‘labour-based’ entitlements? A related problem is what Sen called 
‘derived destitution’. When farmers lose their crops, there is no work for agricultural 
labourers, or even for services like barbers – starving farmers will spend any 
money they have on food, not haircuts – so rural wages and employment 
opportunities also collapse during famines.
Finally, famines occur because of a lack of ‘transfer-based’ entitlements – there 
is either no humanitarian intervention, or famine relief arrives too late to save 
lives and livelihoods. The reasons for this failure are discussed in these Lessons, 
but can include lack of early warning information, conflict that prevents access to 
famine-afflicted communities, or lack of political will to prevent famine.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 Drought causes crop failure, but it is vulnerability to the impacts 
of drought on livelihoods and food systems that causes famine.
2 Famine follows a sequence of failures in the food system: 
first the production of food, then in markets and employment 
opportunities, and finally humanitarian relief such as food aid.
3 In conflict-triggered famines, food production, employment, 
trade and food aid can all be deliberately targeted (if food and 
animals are seized or destroyed) or compromised (if security 
concerns restrict human mobility and flows of food).
4 Famines can be prevented by intervention at any point in the 
food system: by boosting food production, strengthening rural 
food markets, providing employment opportunities (including 
labour-intensive public works), introducing ‘shock-responsive’ 
social protection, or providing timely famine relief.
Key resources
Sen, A. (1981) Poverty 
and Famines: An Essay on 
Entitlement and Deprivation, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press
Devereux, S. (1993) 
Theories of Famine, London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf
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Lesson 2. Marginalisation is often 
at the root of  why people become 
famine stricken.
When famine kills, it does so unevenly. Understanding who is most vulnerable to 
starvation, disease and death, and who is being excluded or left out of relief efforts 
can help us target aid more effectively.
Except in rare exceptions,4 famines do not affect the urban middle classes; they 
are wealthy enough to purchase food and influential enough to enjoy political 
protection against disasters. As Amartya Sen pithily explained in The Political 
Economy of Hunger: ‘In the food battle the devil takes the hindmost’.5 So 
famines typically afflict low-income countries rather than high-income countries, 
poor people rather than the rich, remote rural areas rather than urban centres, 
smallholders or agricultural labourers rather than commercial farmers, and ethnic 
minorities more than dominant ethnic groups. In short, famines afflict groups of 
people who are geographically, economically, socially and politically marginalised.
Demographically, children – especially infants – are the group at greatest risk. In 
the Somalia famine of 2011, 52 per cent of those who died (133,000 people) were 
under five years old.6 The vulnerability of young children is in part due to their 
greater energy requirements vs energy stores, meaning that children die earlier. 
However, in both the 1992 Somalia famine and in Angola in 1993, over two thirds 
and three quarters respectively of those who died were adults and adolescents 
(although this may well have been because the infants had died before recording 
started).7 Peter Salama and Steve Collins reported in Field Exchange that by the 
time of the 1998 famine in South Sudan, this lesson had been forgotten and there 
was no specialist provision for malnourished adolescents or adults. Research 
into famine mortality amongst the aged hardly exists. In the IDS Bulletin, Jeremy 
Swift suggested that in extreme cases households facing famine abandon old 
or particularly vulnerable people as a way of reducing consumption.8 Although 
gendered inequalities generally work against women and girls, there is consistent 
evidence of female mortality advantage (lower death rates for women than men) 
during famines, for a combination of biological and sociocultural reasons.9
Aside from age and gender, social, economic and political factors determine 
who are most at risk. In an IDS Research Report, Stephen Devereux concluded 
that in the Somali Region of Ethiopia, ‘Drought triggers livelihood crises, but the 
underlying causes of vulnerability in Somali Region are social and political, not 
natural.’10 Somali pastoralists are ‘living on the margins’ in almost every sense, 
but their ‘marginalisation comes at a cost – inadequate service provision, high 
vulnerability and lack of protection against livelihood shocks’.11 The Somali Region 
famine of 1999–2000 occurred while the Ethiopian government was preoccupied 
with its border war against Eritrea in the north; too little attention was paid to 
signals of food crisis from this politically marginalised part of southeast Ethiopia. 
Even within Somali Region, marginalisation is multi-layered: pastoralists dominate 
12
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over crop farmers, gendered hierarchies leave women more vulnerable than 
men, elite capture favours powerful clan leaders in aid distribution, and prejudice 
between ethnic groups leaves the interests of ethnic Bantu relatively neglected.
Similarly, during the Somalia famine of 2011, two ‘marginal’ groups made 
up the greatest proportion of those who died. The Rahanweyn and Bantu, 
agro-pastoralists and riverine farmers respectively, have historically lacked power 
and were the target of looting and violence during the previous Somalia famine. 
In Global Food Security, Nisar Majid and Stephen McDowell show that the areas 
that suffered the worst famine conditions were precisely where these groups were 
most heavily concentrated, and that they comprised the majority of the poorest, 
who were also worst affected. These groups were also the majority of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) who had distress migrated due to famine.12
Even forearmed with such knowledge, targeting aid is not straightforward. The 
problem of elite capture is well documented,13 so is the manipulation of aid for 
political, economic or military means (see Lesson 6). Community-based targeting is 
one way of attempting to ensure that marginalised groups are not excluded, as this 
approach typically contains a significant element of participation and transparency. 
However, dominant groups can still manipulate the process such that socially and 
politically marginalised households are not included, as in the example above.
Nor is poverty alone a sufficient indicator of vulnerability. Helen Young and 
Susanne Jaspars showed that in Darfur in 1984,14 poor and rich were equally 
likely to be malnourished. In the IDS Bulletin, Luka Biong Deng showed that in the 
South Sudan famine of 1998 the opposite was in fact true – there was a strong 
correlation between initial wealth and famine mortality15 – as the richer were 
targeted for their asset wealth.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 Children and young infants are at the greatest risk during 
famine. In many situations, however, adults and adolescents 
also die in large numbers. Specialist provision should also be 
made for these two groups.
2 Social, economic and political marginalisation can be at the 
root of vulnerability, but is easy to overlook. This can be 
doubly compounded if humanitarian operations and aid flows 
are captured by elites or dominant groups.
3 Poverty is closely linked to famine, and most often it is the 
poorest who are at highest risk. However, in certain cases 
– especially in conflict-related famines – the socioeconomic 
profile of vulnerability is more complicated.
4 Careful analysis of the causes of famine vulnerability, and 
who is likely to be most vulnerable, should inform targeting of 
pre-famine interventions and humanitarian relief.
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Lesson 3. Early response is key to 
saving lives in famine, but is too often 
hampered by political and technical 
constraints.
One major reason why famines are not prevented is because humanitarian relief 
arrives too late to save lives. Early warning systems have improved dramatically, 
thanks to the technological revolution, so famines are easier to predict, but early 
warning does not always lead to early response. Why not?
Several sources of delay are built into the architecture of the humanitarian response 
system. First, a famine must be identified, but the information needed for this to 
happen might be inadequate, late or concealed. Second, a famine must be officially 
declared, but some governments have incentives to deny that a crisis exists, and 
in other cases donors might suspect that governments are exaggerating.Third, a 
response must be mobilised, but it takes time for pledges to be made and acted 
upon – political will might be deficient, there could be ‘donor fatigue’, or donors could 
face ‘competing imperatives’.16 Finally, food aid must be delivered to famine-affected 
populations, but this can take several weeks, especially if the epicentre of the crisis 
is an inaccessible area with poor roads, transport and communications infrastructure, 
and if there are security threats. Alternatively, if conditions are favourable, local 
purchase or cash transfers can significantly shorten the response time.
Famine early warning systems have been codified since the Indian Famine Codes 
in the 1880s, which identified criteria for declaring ‘near-scarcity’, ‘scarcity’ and 
‘famine’, based on indicators such as low crop yields and rapid food price rises.17 
More recently, the development of ‘famine intensity and magnitude scales’18 and the 
operationalisation of ‘Integrated Food Security Phase Classification’ (IPC) protocols 
allowed the United Nations to make the first ever ‘official’ declaration of an ongoing 
famine (IPC Phase 5) in two regions of southern Somalia on 20 June 2011.19 (The 
second declaration of famine was made in South Sudan in February 2017.) The 
declaration in Somalia required survey evidence that the Crude Mortality Rate 
(CMR) was above two deaths/10,000/day and the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) 
rate was above 30 per cent. However, by this point, even an immediate response 
was already too late to prevent loss of life, and the international community did not 
react seriously to the crisis until the famine was declared. Encouragingly, it looks as 
though that lesson was learned by 2017 with a significant early response in South 
Sudan that may have prevented the worst from happening.
Even when timely and reliable information is available, it does not necessarily lead 
to effective action if institutions are weak, if political accountability is absent, and if 
relations between governments and donors are poor or antagonistic.
In the 1990s, an analysis of several famines and averted famines revealed that the 
main reason why famines were not prevented was not lack of information, but lack 
of political will to intervene. During the 1980s and 1990s, famines were prevented in 
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Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe – all democracies and ‘friends of the West’, who 
received food aid promptly and in generous quantities when food crises threatened.
By contrast, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and North Korea did not prevent famines 
that claimed millions of lives, and the humanitarian response was late in all these 
cases. None of these countries had democratic governments at that time, and 
none were on good terms with the donor community at the critical moment. In 
Famine Early Warning and Response, Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Susanna 
Davies concluded that ‘it is not the severity of the crisis, but relations between 
international donors and national governments which tends to be the single most 
important determinant of the timing and scale of the international response’.20
One way to understand this differential treatment is ‘priority regimes’,21 where 
responsible actors might not prioritise famine prevention ahead of other political 
imperatives. Examples are if a regime is distracted by fighting a war, or if those 
affected are politically marginalised and not protected by an ‘anti-famine political 
contract’, or if the international community is hostile towards the national government.22
Related to this is lack of accountability, which follows from lack of consequences 
for failing to prevent famine, either at national government or international agency 
level. For instance, in her chapter in The New Famines, Jenny Edkins argued for 
‘the criminalisation of mass starvations’, as a crime against humanity.23
Chris Hillbruner and Grainne Moloney’s analysis of why early warning was ‘not 
enough’ to prevent the Somalia famine of 2011 generated several lessons for 
improved early warning and response in future (see ‘Lessons learned’ box).24
LESSONS LEARNED
1 High-quality early warning systems and food security and 
nutrition information systems should be installed in countries 
and regions vulnerable to food crisis and famine.
2 The IPC protocols should be adopted as a universal language 
for describing levels of food insecurity and declaring future 
famines.
3 Early warning systems must better incorporate and analyse 
data on markets, political context (e.g. conflict) and nutrition, 
and should improve the development of scenarios.
4 Early warning systems need to disseminate their findings to 
policymakers in more accessible ways, for better informed 
decision-making.
5 Early warning needs to be complemented with early action. 
Mechanisms need to be found that provide incentives for early 
action by governments, donors, and implementing agencies, 
and build accountability for failures to prevent future famines.
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DURING: Response – management and 
type of response
Lesson 4. Agencies can do more 
harm than good if  they attract 
large numbers of  people into relief  
camps where there is potential for 
communicable disease outbreaks.
Humanitarian relief during famines is often described as being ‘too little, too late’. 
Even worse, badly designed or badly timed interventions can exacerbate the crisis 
rather than help with solving it.
In Famine that Kills, Alex de Waal identified two models of famine mortality.25 First 
is the familiar ‘starvation model’: logically, people starve during famines because 
of lack of food. Second is the ‘health crisis model’: most people die during famines 
not of starvation but disease. These are not necessarily hunger-related diseases 
that hungry people are susceptible to (such as diarrhoea), but waterborne and 
communicable diseases to which famine-affected populations are exposed (like 
cholera or measles). De Waal argues that many African famines are health crises as 
much as food crises, and the majority of deaths result from a failure to understand 
this crucial fact. Moreover, humanitarian responses that focus on delivering food can 
inadvertently create the ideal conditions for killer diseases to spread rapidly.
The reasons for heightened exposure to communicable diseases are because 
famines are not only food crises, they are also water and sanitation crises and 
social crises. Drought-triggered famines reduce the quantity and quality of water 
available for drinking, cooking, washing and cleaning. Poor water quality and 
unsafe sanitation facilities heighten the risk of public health crises. Populations on 
the move are vulnerable to the rapid spread of communicable diseases.
De Waal found evidence for the ‘health crisis model’ of famine mortality from the 
1984/85 famine in Darfur, Sudan, where cases were recorded of famine migrants 
dying of disease even though they still owned livestock and had money in their 
pockets. Also, child undernutrition rates in Darfur during the famine were high, but 
was almost entirely classified as ‘moderate’, which is not life-threatening.
More evidence for the ‘health crisis model’ comes from the Somali Region famine 
in Ethiopia in 1999/2000. Because the government and donor agencies were slow 
to respond, famine mortality had peaked by the time relief camps were established 
and food aid arrived. Analysis by Salama and colleagues in JAMA found two 
peaks in famine mortality.26 The first peak was before humanitarian interventions 
arrived and the second peak was afterwards, when people congregated in relief 
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camps, where hygiene and sanitation conditions were poor. Crucially, the drivers of 
mortality were different before and after: in the pre-intervention phase, wasting was 
the single main cause of death, but in the post-intervention phase the single main 
cause of death was one of four communicable diseases, mainly measles. The 
reason was that the agencies adopted a ‘food first’ response: vaccinations arrived 
later. Salama et al. recommended decentralised food distribution to minimise 
population displacement, and that immunisation of children against measles should 
be prioritised in refugee camps.
Paul Howe explains in the journal Disasters how famine relief camps function as ‘aid 
magnets’ by attracting people desperate for food and other aid, but with ambiguous 
consequences: on the one hand, ‘aid magnets’ raise the visibility of the crisis, which 
increases public awareness and the humanitarian response; on the other hand, they 
can accelerate mortality if they provide too little aid or the wrong kind of aid.27
De Waal proposed several measures for minimising health-related deaths during 
famines, which provide a useful checklist of lessons (see ‘Lessons learned’ box).
LESSONS LEARNED
1 Reduce the necessity for people to migrate in search of food, 
by scaling up social protection in rural communities and 
distributing food aid in famine-affected villages rather than 
setting up camps that become ‘aid magnets’.
2 Supply clean drinking water in famine zones, either by 
protecting and deepening existing wells, digging more 
boreholes, or using water tankers.
3 Provide safe sanitation facilities, such as toilets or improved 
latrines and waste disposal, especially in refugee camps but 
wherever famine-affected people are concentrated.
4 Immunise children against communicable diseases, particularly 
measles, which was the major killer of children during the 
Darfur and Somali Region famines, due to lack of vaccines.
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Lesson 5. Famine is commonly 
thought of  as ‘slow onset’, but the 
response often needs to be very fast.
Famine mortality is both starvation- and disease-related. Each pathway to mortality 
requires specific but differentiated responses. While the process from hunger to 
death by starvation takes several weeks or months, the process from infection to 
death by disease can be extremely rapid.
Mobilising and delivering emergency food aid can take several months, and often 
arrives too late to prevent all loss of life, even if it is early enough to save some lives. 
Where food aid cannot be delivered quickly enough, recent experience suggests 
that cash distributions can be effective. In Somalia in 2011, because the World Food 
Programme (WFP) was stopped by al-Shabaab from distributing food in their areas, 
agencies distributed cash under a programme managed by UNICEF. Talks were held 
in advance by UN leaders with merchants in Dubai to ensure that sufficient supplies 
of food would be available on the ground, and over US$100 million cash was 
distributed.28 The operation was successful, with very little diversion recorded. Where 
the right infrastructure is in place, local purchase can be another good option.
Even if cash can be disbursed more quickly than food, cash is not a universal 
panacea, or necessarily effective. A careful analysis of the cause of the crisis is needed 
(food availability decline or entitlement failure?) as is a market assessment (will traders 
respond to additional demand by trucking in additional supplies?). In Ethiopia in 2015, 
cash distributions were of limited value because of the unavailability of food stocks, 
which required massive importation of food.29 Interestingly, and under-reported, almost 
half of this purchase was undertaken by the government of Ethiopia.30
As argued under Lesson 4, preventing famine migration is hugely preferable,31 but doing 
so can require massive food distributions. In 2015, the Ethiopian government arguably 
prevented famine through a massive scale-up of its already impressive food, cash and 
nutrition distributions.32 However, food aid often arrives too late, especially where there 
is a need for complex procurement and logistics, or where access is hampered. 
The treatment of acute malnutrition is regarded as one of the areas where 
humanitarian response has consistently saved lives, with good practice evolving 
significantly in the last decades. The implementation of community-based 
management of malnutrition and the use of ready-to-use therapeutic foods (RUTF) 
are now considered standard. A blanket supplementary ration should ideally be 
in place to protect therapeutic rations. Securing a reliable supply of RUTF is an 
essential part of emergency planning.
But food aid is not enough – and sometimes should not even be top priority. Writing 
in the IDS Bulletin, Jeremy Swift concludes that, ‘If disease is the main cause of 
famine mortality, anti-famine policies need to be more concerned with the conditions 
which determine disease transmission and with ways of controlling disease spread.’33 
Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD), which includes cholera, has been a major killer in 
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famines, at least from Bangladesh in 1974 to Somalia today.34 Putting in place plans 
for responding to AWD is lifesaving in such situations. A combination of epidemic 
disease surveillance and rapid action teams is the optimal response. Clean water 
and adequate sanitation are key to preventing outbreaks, and drought conditions 
and the accompanying lack of water are often the cause. In a 2003 report for USAID, 
Sue Lautze and colleagues talked about a ‘food first’ bias in the Ethiopian response 
that meant the water, sanitation and health sectors were neglected.35 John Graham 
documents a notable improvement in Ethiopia for ‘non-food’ responses during the 
2015 emergency, as a result of better financing and good coordination.36
In 2017, the protracted conflict in Yemen created famine conditions, displaced 
three million people, and compromised water supplies, sanitation systems and 
health services. All this left people highly susceptible to communicable diseases. 
By July 2017, over 1,500 people had died from the cholera outbreak. The disease 
affected isolated rural communities where people often depend on stagnant ponds 
for drinking water. But it also spread rapidly in hospitals, where malnourished 
children were being treated for AWD, which has very similar symptoms so patients 
could not be easily separated.37
In mass migration situations, communicable diseases – especially measles and AWD – 
are often the main cause of death, with measles killing Somalis in large numbers as they 
fled to Ethiopia in 1992, and again in 2011.38 Shelter too can become critical if conditions 
are adverse, as also happened in Ethiopia in 2011. Mass immunisation is essential and 
time critical. Emergency response to famine migration needs to be fast and effective to 
prevent mass mortality. Interventions to prevent the spread of communicable diseases 
need to be delivered within days of people arriving, including the basics such as clean 
water, adequate sanitation, shelter and medical and nutritional services. 
LESSONS LEARNED
1 There has historically been a ‘food first’ bias in famine 
response, with important sectors such as water, sanitation and 
especially health being relatively neglected. 
2 Famine is always a complex crisis that requires a 
comprehensive, coordinated and integrated response.
3 The treatment of acute malnutrition in emergency situations 
requires a reliable supply of RUTF and protective rations.
4 Preventing famine migration is hugely preferable to responding 
to it. Mass food distributions usually require government 
political will. Innovative practices such as the cash distribution 
in Somalia 2011 can save lives, but is not a panacea.
5 Responding to the health causes of famine mortality saves lives. 
Communicable diseases such as AWD and measles are major 
killers. Good surveillance, an ability to respond rapidly, and mass 
immunisation in situations of famine migration are essential.
6 Context analysis is critical, i.e. understanding the causes of 
the famine, the pathways to mortality and the operating space.
Key resources
The World Health 
Organization has a website 
on cholera: www.who.int/
cholera/en/ and on measles: 
www.who.int/immunization/
diseases/measles/en/ both of 
which are highly informative, 
with lots of good resources.
Collins, S.; Dent, N.; 
Binns, P.; Bahwere, P.; 
Sadler, K. and Hallam, A. 
(2006) ‘Management of 
Severe Acute Malnutrition 
in Children’ The Lancet, 
25 September. This article 
is the definitive piece on the 
management of severe acute 
malnutrition in children. 
19
DURING: Response – management and type of response
Lesson 6. In famine-affected conflict 
zones, gaining access is always the 
most complicated factor.
Conflict is a major cause of famine. Throughout history, famine has been used as 
a method of war, with siege the most obvious manifestation of this. In Complex 
Emergencies, David Keen argues that famine can be a deliberate strategy on the part 
of powerful local groups for political, economic or military reasons.39 Quoting Indian 
economist Rangasami, he asserts that it is important to understand the function of 
famine. Rangasami studied Indian markets in times of famine and concluded that 
merchants colluded to push prices higher, benefiting financially from the hunger. In 
The Benefits of Famine, Keen recounts a Sudanese businessman during the late 
1980s telling him the famine had been ‘sent by god’, it had so enriched him.40
In his book Famine Crimes, Alex de Waal extensively documents the trajectory 
of the 1984 famine in northern Ethiopia.41 He attributes the principal cause of this 
famine to the counter-insurgency campaign by the Ethiopian army and air force. 
A comprehensive strategy of bombing markets, limiting trade, forcibly displacing 
populations, requisitioning surpluses and manipulating aid led directly to the famine.
Examples of famine as a result of conflict and the pursuit of politico–military 
strategies are sadly abundant. In Biafra’s secessionist war in the 1960s, the 
government attempted to starve the population into surrender; the secessionists in 
turn used the famine as a way of mobilising overseas support and flew arms in on 
aid planes at night.42 
International geopolitical concerns are rarely absent in famine. The Somalia famine 
of 2011 provides an instructive case study. A severe drought in the preceding 
year had led to poor harvests in the Shabelle river valley, the most fertile and 
densely populated part of rural Somalia. The Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist group in 
control, al-Shabaab, compounded this by banning WFP and several other major 
aid organisations from distributing food. But this was made worse by the US 
government (up to that point the largest food aid donor) restricting where agencies 
could work to avoid food falling into the hands of al-Shabaab.43
Today it can be argued that famine conditions in both Yemen and South Sudan 
have political origins with internationalised elements. Both the Saudi–Emirati 
coalition and the Houthi ‘rebels’ have been criticised for the conduct of war, as 
have their backers in the USA/UK and Iran.44 The government of South Sudan 
is heavily aid dependent, but also a belligerent with clear responsibilities for the 
welfare of populations under its ostensible control.
In Somalia the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has talked about 
conflict and climate uncertainty combining to cause ‘double vulnerability’.45 This 
has perhaps intensified the cycle of food insecurity with people unable to recover 
fully following the 2011 famine.
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In the journal Disasters, Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi categorise famines as 
caused by acts of omission or acts of commission.46 Acts of omission are where 
governments or belligerents block relief aid, as in several of the examples above. 
Sudan in 1991 exported its grain reserve whilst people were starving, a different type 
of act of omission. Acts of commission include scorched earth policies of the type de 
Waal describes in Ethiopia: forcible displacement, siege or economic blockade.
How should aid be delivered in such politically and militarily contested situations? 
Unfortunately, there are few easy answers. In Ethiopia in 1984, only one twentieth of the 
aid went to Tigray (where the rebellion was), despite it having one third of the famine 
victims.47 The same was true in Sudan in the later 1980s. At the same time, aid was 
diverted to government soldiers and to enclaves or populations loyal to governments.
Faced with a lack of access – or often just as bad, partial access – aid agencies 
have very difficult choices to make. Should they speak out against those denying 
access and causing famine? Or should they work quietly behind the scenes, gaining 
what limited access they can? In Ethiopia in 1984, media exposure of the famine, 
against the government’s wishes, enabled aid agencies to deliver relief to some 
famine victims. The international shame was enough to push the government into 
allowing response. However, the government’s subsequent forced resettlement 
programme caused further deaths and suffering, and many agencies did not speak 
out for fear of being denied access by the government. De Waal estimated that a 
minimum of 50,000 people had died during the forced relocations.48
Lack of access is not just about whether relief can be delivered. It is also about people 
having safe access to the basics they need for life (to avoid starvation and disease): 
physical access to land, markets, agricultural inputs and basic health and water services. 
Aid agencies must understand the contested arena in which they find themselves, and 
that often famine is a deliberate strategy in times of war. They must seriously reflect and 
make judgements on when trying to help is doing more harm than good, be prepared to 
withdraw, and constantly update their analysis of how close to their red lines they are.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 Famine can be a deliberate strategy. In understanding the 
causes, it is important to think of the function of famine, which 
often has a political, economic or military rationale.
2 Famines can be caused by acts of omission or acts of 
commission. Acts of commission are deliberate; omission 
often relates to blockages of relief aid or simple neglect.
3 Manipulation of aid is common in conflict. Access is denied 
by warring parties, and aid diverted to supporters. Geopolitics 
are often involved in supporting one side in the conflict, often 
adding to the way in which aid can be manipulated.
4 Gaining access is political and requires advocacy and quiet 
behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Ultimately, agencies must be 
prepared to withdraw if they consider their aid has become 
part of the problem.
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Lesson 7. One proven solution to 
famine is a safety net that prevents 
catastrophic asset loss and income failure.
India has not suffered a mass mortality famine since the Great Bengal famine of 
1943. One reason is that the post-independence government resolved that famines 
were an unacceptable part of India’s colonial history, and would no longer be 
tolerated. This established an ‘anti-famine political contract’ between the state and 
its citizens, that India’s democratic institutions have upheld ever since. Numerous 
large-scale safety net programmes have been put in place, such as the Public 
Distribution System, the Midday Meals Programme, and the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), in order to ensure 
the realisation of India’s constitutional right to food for all.
Based largely on India’s success in eradicating famine, Amartya Sen has argued 
that democracy – opposition political parties, free and fair elections, a vigilant and 
campaigning media – is the best antidote to famine, and that famines have never 
occurred in functioning multi-party democracies.49 Sen contrasted democratic 
India’s success with communist China’s failure to prevent the Great Leap Forward 
famine of 1958–61. In terms of mortality, this was the worst famine in history, killing 
an estimated 30 million people. Sen attributed the Great Leap Forward famine to 
the absence of political freedoms and of the incentives and information associated 
with democratic regimes. In terms of incentives, China’s rulers were not subjected 
to electoral accountability. In terms of information, China had no free press to 
expose the famine and compel a humanitarian response.
But democracy is not a guaranteed solution.50 Democratic accountability also 
needs an effective governance system, including a high-level political commitment 
to prevent famine. Since the turn of the century, four mass mortality famines have 
occurred – in Ethiopia (2000), Malawi (2002), Niger (2005) and Somalia (2011). 
Three of these four countries – all except Somalia – were multi-party democracies 
with regular elections when famine struck, which appears to violate Sen’s ‘rule’.51 
However, these are very young democracies, and their democratic institutions are 
not yet deeply embedded. Civil society, including the media, is generally weaker in 
Africa than in India, and is often suppressed. Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger are also 
among the world’s poorest countries, so their capacity to intervene during food 
crises is limited, leaving responsibility for famine prevention to the international 
community. But humanitarian agencies like WFP are not directly accountable to 
famine-affected people, so there is no ‘anti-famine political contract’ in place.
Another political incentive is shame. In 2005 the Government of Ethiopia 
launched the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), partly reflecting its 
genuine commitment to ending famine but also in an effort to end the shame of 
its dependency on annual emergency appeals for food aid. The PSNP combined 
cash or food transfers to poor people who are unable to work with public works 
employment on community infrastructure projects for food-insecure people who 
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can work. Many environmental public works activities, such as soil and water 
conservation and hillside terracing, aim at ‘famine-proofing’ rural communities.
Together with household asset packages that support alternative income-
generating activities, to diversify livelihood risk in rain-fed agriculture-dependent 
communities, the PSNP has promoted more resilient livelihoods for millions of 
smallholder farming families in the historically famine-prone Ethiopian Highlands. 
Several evaluations have confirmed that the PSNP reduces the annual hunger gap 
in chronically food-insecure households.52 There is also evidence that the PSNP 
protects households against having to sell their productive assets (e.g. oxen and 
ploughs) for food in years of rain failure.53
A recent innovation in safety net programming in rural food-insecure contexts is 
‘shock-responsive safety nets’, which link relief and development by scaling up 
regular social protection during the annual hungry season and in bad years, both 
by registering additional beneficiaries temporarily and by increasing the value of 
cash or food transfers to existing beneficiaries.54 Successful applications of this 
idea include the PSNP in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) 
in Kenya.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 The best antidote to famine is an ‘anti-famine political 
contract’, meaning that the state acknowledges its duty to 
prevent famine, and mechanisms exist for citizens to hold the 
state accountable if a famine occurs.
2 An ‘anti-famine political contract’ can be secured through the 
institutions of multi-party democracy, but democracy is not 
essential and might not always be sufficient. Although this is not 
an area that international agencies can directly influence, they 
can support civil society advocacy to promote the right to food, 
which most governments have ratified in international law.
3 Social protection programmes have been found to be effective 
in reducing food insecurity. ‘Shock-responsive safety nets’ 
are emerging as a potential anti-famine intervention – not in 
isolation, but as a complement to traditional famine responses.
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Lesson 8. The media can play a crucial 
role in reporting and preventing famines.
Amartya Sen has argued that in countries that enjoy a free press and are able to 
hold governments to account, famines are less likely to happen.55
In the run-up to the 1984 Ethiopia famine, aid agencies, Western governments and 
the media were all aware that the crisis had already started and the death toll was 
rising. Despite various attempts by the media to bring attention to the crisis, it was 
not until Michael Buerk’s televised report on 23 October 1984 that the famine was 
finally publicly acknowledged and aid came pouring in. According to Suzanne Franks 
in Reporting Disaster, in order to make the story newsworthy, Buerk packaged the 
Ethiopia famine as a ‘biblical’ and unexpected event caused (simplistically) by drought 
and food shortage. He used images of emaciated people in Korem, combined with 
a powerful script, to position the famine as an unforeseen natural disaster, worthy of 
coverage, and with helpless innocent victims in urgent need of support.56 
The media, therefore, can act as an early warning system, but it often fails to 
do so. By the time a story grabs the headlines, it is arguably already too late.57 
During and after the 1984 Ethiopia famine, by bringing attention to the failure of 
the government to avert famine and its subsequent resettlement programme, the 
media also played a role in antagonising the relationship between aid agencies 
and the national government, and alerting the public to the government’s expulsion 
or threat of expulsion of aid agencies from the country.58
Despite Buerk’s (partial) success, famines – as opposed to other disasters – 
often fail to reach the headlines. This is because (1) famines are not dramatic, 
unexpected events but long-term processes and their causes are often far too 
difficult to explain in a short news report;59 and (2) the causes of famines are 
complex and are not well served by the media which seeks a clear, uncomplicated 
narrative of disasters at the expense of well-informed reporting on their historical, 
social, political and economic context.60 (The crucial fact that the Ethiopian 
government was fighting a war during the 1984 famine against rebel forces in 
Eritrea and Tigray was largely ignored in media representations of the famine.)
Instead, ‘short and shrill’-style reporting accompanied by engaging sound bites61 
and ‘clichéd’62 but arresting images is the recipe for a good disaster story. Alex 
de Waal warns against ‘Over-hyped naively “humanitarian” reporting’, devoid of 
contextual and political analysis, which would ‘be as bad as no reporting at all.’63
This criticism is not lost on aid agencies. On the one hand, they want to provide 
a nuanced understanding of a crisis to the public. On the other, they are aware 
of their reliance on the media to reach a wider audience and solicit aid. Disasters 
would not exist without the media64 and aid agencies often find themselves in a 
close and sometimes unhealthy ‘symbiotic relationship’ with the media, complicit in 
the construction of over-simplified narratives in return for support in raising funds 
and promoting their own profiles.65 From 1990/99, economic sanctions imposed 
by the UN Security Council against Iraq created famine-like conditions in the 
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country with high rates of mortality for children aged under five, an increase in 
child malnutrition, and food shortage. In The New Famines, Haris Gazdar argues 
that it was the economic isolation and the subsequent breakdown of Iraq’s welfare 
state that brought about a ‘policy-induced famine’ which saw Iraq experience pre-, 
modern and post-modern famine ‘sequentially and simultaneously’.66 Yet, at that 
time, Iraq did not fit the stereotype of a country experiencing famine and thus the 
world’s media never characterised the situation as such.
In this sense, there is a need for the media to exercise what Glenda Cooper describes 
in From their Own Correspondent? as ‘media social responsibility’, not only in reporting 
responsibly and rigorously on disasters, but also in accepting the role the media can 
and should play before, during and after crises.67 With a strong correlation between 
media coverage of humanitarian crises and global response in the form of public 
donations, and humanitarian assistance, it is imperative that aid agencies and the 
media use their combined strengths to work closely to lobby for informed action. This 
applies not only to foreign media; NGOs should seek to involve local media in order 
to reach and inform affected populations, and allow local voices to be heard.68 Aid 
agencies also need to collaborate with media initiatives and networks that facilitate 
debate, provide information and reflect on global stories but from a local perspective.69
With the advent of social media, the use of user-generated content (UGC), citizen 
journalists, and the rise of new donors in Turkey and Islamic NGOs,70 users of new 
digital and mobile technologies are able to challenge previously held ‘truths’ and call 
into question the sanitised, simple messages put forward by traditional media. Social 
media activists are a powerful force to drive forward social change and action.71 
Aid agencies should take advantage of this democratisation of information through 
investing more resources in developing a strong social media presence and growing 
their networks internationally but most importantly, in disaster-affected countries.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 Traditional reporting has often misrepresented famine. 
Working closely with aid agencies to understand the 
complexities of the situation before, during and after famine 
would improve reporting and help shift the narrative to a 
discussion around longer-term solutions to recurrent famines.
2 In order to lobby for action, aid agencies should involve the 
local media: informing local affected populations and giving 
them voice is imperative to encourage change.
3 Aid agencies should collaborate more closely with media 
initiatives and networks that seek to promote better 
communication and engagement with affected communities to 
ensure that well-informed messages reach the public. At the 
same time, they need to maintain their own identity and integrity.
4 Instead of over-relying on traditional media for fundraising and 
publicity, aid agencies should invest more resources in developing 
strong social media campaigns for humanitarian action and 
expanding their networks to build a campaign base for action.
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Lesson 9. It can take years to recover 
from asset loss due to famine.
Famine can have a major impact on people’s lives for years afterwards, often 
changing permanently the way they live. Whilst it can never be the major 
preoccupation, putting in place measures to help people recover quickly from 
the effects of famine can have major benefits. Often this is framed as saving 
livelihoods as well as saving lives.
Destitution is a key part of the process from shock to starvation.72 It is also an 
outcome, whereby people have lost key productive assets and the ability to meet their 
minimum subsistence needs.73 Restoring this capacity is clearly essential to recovery.
In his landmark essay on poverty and famines, Amartya Sen identified several 
groups who fell into destitution during the 1973–74 famine in the Wollo region 
of Ethiopia, including pastoralists, farm and day labourers, small land-owning 
cultivators, tenant cultivators, women in service occupations, weavers and other 
craftsmen and occupational beggars.74 Pastoralists have been particularly hard hit in 
recent near-famines in Ethiopia, and in Somalia in 2011 the hardest hit groups were 
marginalised day labourers and small-scale riverine farmers75 (see also Lesson 2).
For pastoralists, the traditional recovery response has been restocking. Much 
better is to put in place measures to help pastoralists before animals become 
worthless, such as animal camps or schemes to support prices. In the Journal 
of Humanitarian Assistance, Andy Catley and Adrian Cullis estimate the cost of 
commercial destocking in the Somali Region of Ethiopia at 29 times less than relief 
and restocking.76 
In the journal Disasters, Alison Pyle found that the resilience of households to 
famine in El Fasher in North Dafur, Sudan during the 1982–89 drought was not 
dependent on assets as the drought was severe enough to overwhelm and deplete 
the resources of even the wealthiest in the villages.77 Factors that helped were 
access to labour, social networks and prior experience of coping with drought 
(especially knowledge of labour opportunities in the provincial capital). Food aid 
in Turkana County in Kenya led to a downward trend in sales of livestock in 1995, 
leading Jennifer Bush in Disasters to conclude that people could preserve their 
assets if relief supplies were sufficient.78 
In the IDS Bulletin, Jeremy Swift notes that as early as 300BC the Indian book of 
statecraft The Arthashastra was recommending the setting up of ‘Food-for-work 
public works programmes “such as building forts or irrigation works” ’.79 Evidence 
from numerous responses in South Asia demonstrate that access to work during 
famine and emergency can help prevent asset loss, or help people recover faster. 
Access to credit may also be a factor.
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More recently, there has been a lot of policy work in the area of resilience.80 This 
broadly looks at whether famine and food insecurity can be prevented through 
helping with coping strategies, or achieving transformative changes in people’s 
ability to withstand shocks. This forms part of a longer tradition of looking at the 
linkages between relief and development.81 Scalable ‘shock-responsive safety nets’ 
(such as Ethiopia’s PSNP) and basic services are part of this new line of thinking.
In the IDS Bulletin, Susanna Davies cautions that what appear to be short-
term coping strategies can in fact be longer-term, more permanent adaptations 
to a deteriorating food security situation.82 Johan Pottier and James Fairhead 
demonstrated in their work on the 1984 famine in Bwisha, North Kivu, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, that permanent changes in cropping, diet, trade and social 
relations had resulted.83 Recovery, if it could be called such, was as difficult for 
some groups as the famine itself. 
Whilst there is less evidence on the impact of policy measures, it is clear that some 
relaxation of rules takes place in times of great hardship to allow people more 
coping opportunities. This ranges from allowing tree cutting for charcoal sales to 
turning a blind eye to contraband, or the tacit facilitation of migration.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 Famine can lead to destitution and permanent livelihood 
changes. Recovery efforts should support new livelihood 
options as well as trying to recover old ones.
2 Action in advance of famines such as commercial destocking, 
and the trade infrastructure to facilitate this, can both preserve 
assets and help people cope.
3 Asset holdings may not be the only factor in surviving famine, 
or even the most relevant. Access to employment and social 
capital are as – if not more – important.
4 Public works projects are an excellent way of providing 
additional labour opportunities. 
5 Policy measures – either on an emergency basis or the 
relaxation of certain prescriptions – may also have significant 
benefits in helping people cope and recover faster.
6 Finally, perhaps the most crucial lesson is the one that always 
seems to be forgotten most quickly: the aftermath of a famine 
is the best time for reflection on (a) why the famine happened, 
(b) what went right and what went wrong in the humanitarian 
response effort, and (c) putting in place mechanisms, 
institutions and resources to ‘famine-proof’ vulnerable 
communities in order to ensure that the famine cycle is not 
repeated again a few years later.
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Lesson 10. Preventing future famines 
requires strengthening accountability 
mechanisms.
Famines in the twenty-first century are sociopolitical crises rather than natural 
disasters. In most cases famine can be prevented through timely action, either 
on the part of national authorities or by international actors. When famine is used 
deliberately as a method of war, prevention may not be possible, but arguably 
those responsible can be held to account.
Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi categorise famines as acts of commission or acts 
of omission – they are either deliberately created, or no action is taken to prevent 
them.84 In both cases there is an inherent notion of responsibility. In her chapter 
in The New Famines, Jenny Edkins proposes re-politicising famine, or mass 
starvation as she prefers it to be called, ‘from natural disaster to crime against 
humanity’.85 She suggests the question, ‘Who committed the famine?’ should be 
asked, and ‘Who were the victims?’86 Amartya Sen has argued that famines do not 
happen in democracies, or rather that leaders can almost always afford to stop 
people starving should they choose to do so.87 It is only when people in positions 
of power have lost touch with those who might starve (and have no political stake 
in their wellbeing) that acts of omission can occur.
Alex de Waal has written extensively on this subject, including in his book 
Famine Crimes. In a 2017 article for the London Review of Books, he argues that 
various efforts to create the crime of ‘faminogenesis’, or deliberate mass starvation 
have failed due to complexity and lack of political will.88 Proving a deliberate 
act of mass starvation is complex because of the other factors that might be 
involved – crop failures, market failures, actions of various sides in conflict, and 
so on. Political will is lacking because the great powers wish to reserve weapons 
such as blockades and sieges, and thus are loathe to criminalise them. USAID 
administrator Andrew Natsios famously declared there would be no ‘famine on my 
watch’, which there was not, despite famine conditions existing in Ethiopia during 
that period.
Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux have proposed a ‘famine accountability matrix’ 
that identifies who is responsible at each stage of the famine process, including 
prediction and prevention.89 They propose a graded approach whereby famines 
caused by acts of omission would incur lower sanctions than acts of commission, 
with mass starvation the most serious. Adopting such an approach might begin 
to disentangle the inevitable post-crisis blame game where responsibility is never 
established and accountability is never enforced.
Dan Maxwell and colleagues reached a similar conclusion in a special issue of 
Global Food Security following the 2011 Somalia famine: the one underlying cause 
of the Somalia famine was accountability failures, a deficit that must be addressed 
to prevent future famines.90 Writing in the same journal, Peter Salama and 
colleagues argued that, ‘the next important step for the international community 
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may be to ensure a clearer and more robust link between data and accountability 
for action in humanitarian response’.91
There are several avenues that exist in terms of the law. There is already a 
significant body of work by UN Rapporteurs on the right to food. There are 
prohibitions against the use of starvation as a method of war in International 
Humanitarian Law (in particular article 54 of the Geneva Convention Additional 
Protocols of 1977). Perhaps most significantly – or most concretely – there are 
countries that have either explicit or implicit ‘anti-famine political contracts’, such 
as India and Ethiopia. This latter certainly serves as an enforceable model in 
countries where there is a degree of political accountability.
Writers such as Jenny Edkins, David Keen and Alex de Waal go further, calling 
for mass starvation to be added to the list of crimes against humanity, and for 
perpetrators to be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court.
LESSONS LEARNED
1 When famine is used deliberately as a method of war, all 
efforts should be made to hold those responsible accountable 
for their crimes.
2 Where there is political will, famines – even deliberate famines 
– can be prevented. Public pressure and advocacy on political 
leaders is important to trigger this.
3 The body of law surrounding the use of famine as a method of 
war needs development so that eventually mass starvation is 
considered a war crime.
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